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UNTWISTING THE STRONG-ARM:
PROTECTING FRAUD VICTIMS FROM
BANKRUPTCY COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Put yourself for a moment in the position of Grandma and
Grandpa. You worked hard your entire life, paid for your children's
college education, and by clipping coupons and watching your money
you were able to save a small retirement fund. You invested this
money in an apartment building which will provide enough monthly
rental income to allow you to retire comfortably, play golf, and spend
some time with your grandchildren.
As you are about to retire, you discover that the broker who
handled the purchase of the building fraudulently recorded the deed
to the building in the broker's name. You are shocked to learn that
you've been the victim of such an act. To your further dismay, you
learn that the broker has declared bankruptcy and the building is
about to be sold to pay off the broker's creditors. You rush to the
bankruptcy court and tell the judge your story, expecting that the
judge will set things right.
The judge listens to your story and believes every word. None-
theless the judge then orders the building to be sold, with the pro-
ceeds being used to pay the broker's creditors. The judge tells you
not to worry, that you have a claim against the broker's bankruptcy
estate, but you will probably only receive pennies on the dollar of the
money you lost. The balance of the money, the judge explains, will
be going to several large banks who had voluntarily loaned the bro-
ker millions of dollars.
As if in a dream, you begin to wonder whether you are still in the
United States. In the United States judges are supposed to right
wrongs, not be accomplices to fraud. This scenario may sound too
unbelievable to be true. But courts across the country have done ex-
actly this. This Comment looks at the law these judges have so cru-
elly twisted.
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H. BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Code and the Strong-Arm Clause
Simply stated, the purpose of bankruptcy laws "is to provide a
collective forum for sorting out the rights of the various claimants
against the assets of a debtor where there are not enough assets to go
around."' To this end, the principal goals of bankruptcy policy are:
"(1) equality of distribution among creditors, (2) a fresh start for
debtors, and (3) economical administration."'2 Because the purpose
of the bankruptcy laws is to sort out claims against the debtor's as-
sets, two questions arise: (1) What assets are available to distribute
to the debtor's creditors, and (2) How is the distribution managed?
The answer to the second question is simple. All the assets
which can be used to satisfy creditors' claims against the debtor are
brought into the bankruptcy estate. From this estate all of the claims
are satisfied.4 The first question, however, is not so easy to answer.
Certainly any of the debtor's interests in property are assets
which can be used to satisfy claims and are included in the bank-
ruptcy estate." The bankruptcy laws, however, go beyond this limited
definition. They include assets in the estate that, although not in fact
assets of the debtor, are considered assets of the debtor to further the
goals of the bankruptcy laws. These assets include assets that the
debtor has transferred to defraud creditors,6 assets that the debtor
has transferred to some creditors preferentially at the expense of
others,' and assets that the debtor's creditors would have been able to
claim outside of bankruptcy.'
This last class of assets-those that creditors could reach outside
of bankruptcy-are brought into the estate through the trustee's
strong-arm powers Prior to 1978, the strong-arm provision con-
ferred upon the trustee the status of a judicial lien creditor. The
1. David G. Epstein et al., BANKRUPrCY § 1-2 (1992).
2- See Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Rep.
No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 75 (1973) [hereinafter Commission Report].
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
4. See Begier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53,58 (1990).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
6. See id. § 548.
7. See id. § 547.
8. See i. § 544.
9. See id.
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) (repealed 1978).
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Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978" expanded the trustee's status to
include that of a bona fide purchaser of real property. 2 It is the trus-
tee's status as a bona fide purchaser of real property that this Com-
ment addresses.
Some courts have interpreted the bona fide purchaser status to
allow the trustee to bring into the bankruptcy estate property to
which the debtor acquired title through fraud. 3 To the extent that
the purpose of bankruptcy laws is to sort out claims against the
debtor's property, this interpretation is indefensible. Property ac-
quired through fraud is not the debtor's property, and a court does
not further the purpose of the bankruptcy laws by including such
property in the estate. Similarly, including the assets in the estate
does not further the goal of providing a "fair and equitable" distribu-
tion of the debtor's assets to those with claims against the debtor.
Equating the fraud victim's claim to a voluntary creditor's claim to
property which, by all rights belongs to the victim, is neither fair nor
equitable.
B. The Problem
The tension between § 541 and § 544 originated with the pre-
1984 version of the Code. Prior to 1984, § 541(d) provided that prop-
erty in which the debtor held only legal and not equitable title be-
came property of the estate under § 541(a) only to the extent of the
debtor's legal title.14 However, § 544 permitted the trustee to bring
certain equitable interests that were not held by the debtor into the
estate." The issues addressed by the courts were whether there was a
conflict between § 541(d) and § 544, and, if so, which section pre-
vailed.
Some courts held that § 541(d) prevailed over § 544, reasoning
that to hold otherwise would render § 541(d) meaningless. 6 Accord-
ing to these courts, Congress could not have meant to allow the trus-
tee to benefit from property that the debtor did not own.' Other
11. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549..
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1994).
13. See, e.g., Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).
14. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, § 541(d).
15. See City Nat'l Bank v. General Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee
Corp.), 828 F.2d 699,704-05 (11th Cir. 1987).
16. See id. at 705.
17. See Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d
1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 1985).
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courts held that § 541 and § 544 operated independently. 8 According
to these courts, § 541(d) qualifies the trustee's rights under § 541(a)
to succeed to certain property interests of the debtor as of the time of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 9 Section 544, in contrast, per-
mits the trustee to bring into the estate property of the debtor which
had been improperly transferred notwithstanding the limitations of §
541(d).20 Thus, property not brought into the estate under § 541,
could be brought into the estate under § 544.21
In Belisle v. PlunkettO the bankruptcy debtor had organized sev-
eral partnerships to raise funds to purchase a leasehold interest.'
Despite acquiring the interest with partnership funds, the debtor re-
corded the purchase in his own name.24 The bankruptcy trustee
sought to include the interest in the bankruptcy estate, while the de-
frauded partners attempted to quiet title in the partnerships.' In
analyzing whether the interest was part of the estate, the court noted
that courts which had found a conflict between § 541 and § 544 failed
to discuss that § 541(d) qualified only § 541(a) and not § 544(a)(3). 2,
The court concluded that because § 541(d) was so limited, there was
no conflict between § 541 and § 544(a).' Reasoning that if a bona
fide purchaser's rights came ahead of the true owner, then the trustee
would come ahead of the true owner under § 544(a)(3).' Thus, the
court held that the trustee could bring into the estate through §
544(a)(3) property acquired by the debtor through fraud29
The tension between § 541 and § 544 continued after § 541(d)
was amended in 1984. In In re Seaway Express,30 the bankruptcy
debtor had given a security interest in its accounts receivable and in-
ventory, and the proceeds of either, to a lender to secure a line of
credit.3' The debtor received a parcel of real property as payment
18. See In re General Coffee Corp., 828 F.2d at 705.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).
23. See id. at 513.
24. See id
25. See id.
26. See id. at 515.
27. See id. at 514.
28. See id. at 515.
29. See id.
30. National Bank of Alaska v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express), 912 F.2d
1125 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. See id. at 1126.
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from one of its account debtors.n The debtor refused to execute a
trust deed on the property to the lender.3 After the debtor declared
bankruptcy, the lender asserted that it had an equitable interest in
the property, allowing it to remove the property from the estate.3
The court noted that § 541(d) excluded from the estate equitable in-
terests held by others.3 ' However, the court noted further, that §
541(d), as amended in 1984, reached only property included in the es-
tate under § 541(a)(1) and (2).36 Section 541(d) no longer affected
"property brought into the estate by the trustee's avoidance powers
under §§ 541(a)(3)-(7)."
C. A Framework for Analyzing the Bankruptcy Code
The first step in analyzing the Bankruptcy Code is to look at the
plain language of the statute. Where the "statutory scheme is co-
herent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to in-
quire beyond the plain language of the statute."39 However, the Su-
preme Court has cautioned: "In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."' "The
strict language of the Bankruptcy Code does not control, even if the
statutory language has a 'plain' meaning, if the application of that
language 'will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the inten-
tion of its drafters.
' ' 41
When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write
"on a clean slate."42 In determining the drafters' intent, there is a
presumption that Congress intended to keep continuity between pre-
Code practice and the Bankruptcy Code.43 Where the language of the
statute is ambiguous, there must be some evidence in the legislative
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1127.
35. See id. at 1127-28.
36. See id. at 1128.
37. Id.
38. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
40. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,43 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
41. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 495 U.S. at 565 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242).
42. See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515,521 (1943).
43. See id. at 563; Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47; Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,501 (1986).
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history to indicate that Congress had the intent to effect a major
change in pre-Code law."
The steps to follow in analyzing a provision of the Bankruptcy
Code can be summarized as: (1) Look at the text of the provision to
see if it is ambiguous or is inconsistent with the policies of the Bank-
ruptcy Code; (2) If there is an ambiguity, determine the pre-Code
law; and (3) Look to the legislative history of the Code provision for
an expressed intent to change the pre-Code law.
This Comment does not follow the Supreme Court rule to look
at the text first. Instead, this Comment takes a chronological ap-
proach. Part III traces the development of the relevant portions of
the pre-Code law. Part IV analyzes the legislative history to deter-
mine whether Congress intended to change the pre-Code law. Part V
looks at the text of the Bankruptcy Code to determine if the text un-
ambiguously effects a change in the pre-Code law. Because the cases
which have interpreted the Code have focused on the text of the
Code, Part V looks at the text in the context of these cases. Part V
concludes that the text of the Code's strong-arm clause contains some
ambiguities, and more importantly, conflicts with the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code. Part VI concludes by proposing an amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code to address these deficiencies.
III. THE PRE-CODE LAW
A. Pre-1910: The Trustee Stands in the Shoes of the Bankrupt
Congress enacted the first American bankruptcy law in 1800,
only to repeal it three years later.45 Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, Congress enacted and repealed several bankruptcy statutes.
These early acts defined the property of the estate47 very simply as
the property or estate of the debtor. For example, the 1800 Act
44. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (citing United Savings
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988); Penn-
sylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 495 U.S. at 563; Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at
244-45).
45. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
46. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
47. The phrase "property of the estate" did not until the Bankruptcy code
was enacted. See Commission Report, supra note 2, Pt. II, § 4-601 note 2, at 149.
For clarity, this Comment uses the phrase to refer to the property brought under
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and available to settle the creditors'
claims against the debtor.
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imposed a duty upon the bankrupt to convey and assign his "estate"
to the assignee "for the use of all . . . the creditors of such bank-
rupt.
,,08
The Bankruptcy Act, of 1898 4 continued this tradition by vest-
ing the trustee "by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt" to
six classes of property.f Among these was all "property which...
[the debtor] could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him."'"
Despite the apparently broad scope of property that the law brought
into the estate, the trustee did not in fact succeed to the title of all
property that the bankrupt could have transferred by any means.
The trustee was vested with title only to the property that the bank-
rupt could have transferred legally.52
The trustee had no greater right or title to the property than the
bankrupt' Under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee took the debtor's
property subject to all valid claims, hens, and equities that existed in the
hands of the debtor.-4 Property of other persons in the possession of the
debtor did not form part of the estate.55 When there was a dispute as to
the title of property in the debtor's possession, the trustee could take
48. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, § 18, 2 Stat. at 26.
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, cl. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
50. See id. § 70a, 30 Stat. at 565-66 (vesting the trustee
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt... to all (1) docu-
ments relating to his property; (2) interests in patents, patent fights,
copyrights, and trade-marks; (3) powers which he might have exercised
for his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised for
some other person; (4) property transferred by him in fraud of his credi-
tors; (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him...; and (6) rights of action arising
upon contracts or from the unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to,his property").
51. Id. § 70a(5), 30 Stat. at 566.
52. See WILLIAM H. OPPENHEIMER, BRANDENBURG ON BANKRUPTCY § 769
(4th ed. 1917).
53. See York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344, 352 (1906); Hewit v. Berlin
Mach. Works, 194 U.S. 296, 302 (1904); Yeatman v. Savings Inst., 95 U.S. 764,
766 (1877) ("[The trustee] takes only the bankrupt's interest in property. He has
no right or title to the interest which other parties have therein, nor any control
over the same, further than is expressly given to him by the Bankrupt Act...
(internal quotations omitted)).
54. See York Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. at 352; Yeatman, 95 U.S. at 766; FRANK 0.
LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY §
149, at 439 (3d ed. 1907).
55. See York Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. at 350-53; Hewit, 194 U.S. at 299-303; Yeat-
man, 95 U.S. at 766-67; LOVELAND, supra note 28, § 152, at 444.
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possession, but not title, until the court determined ownership.
56
Additionally, the trustee was vested with title to "property trans-
ferred by [the bankrupt] in fraud of his creditors."" Preferential
transfers from the bankrupt were considered constructively fraudu-
lent.58 Thus, the trustee was given title to property that was trans-
ferred in actual fraud of the bankrupt's creditors, as well as property
that was preferentially transferred to certain creditors.59
The only right or title the trustee had to the debtor's property
was acquired under section 70.6 If property of the debtor was not
within one of the six enumerated categories, then it would not pass to
the trustee.6' As the trustee was not given title over any other prop-
erty, no other property could be used to satisfy the claims against the
debtor.62
In Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works 3 the debtor purchased two
wood-working machines from the creditor and signed two promissory
notes that reserved title and right of possession of the property in the
seller until the buyer fully paid for the machines." New York law
provided that this conditional sales contract was "void as against
subsequent purchasers, pledgees or mortgagees in good faith" unless
it was recorded.' The creditor did not comply with the filing re-
quirements until after the trustee was appointed. The Court noted
that the trustee was not vested with any better right or title to the
debtor property than that of the bankrupt." Because the conditional
sales contract was void only as against subsequent purchasers,
pledgees, or mortgagees, and not as against the debtor, the contract
was valid as against the trustee and, the trustee could not bring the
56. See LOVELAND, supra note 28, § 152, at 444.
57. Bankruptcy Act, § 70a(4), 30 Stat. at 566.
58. See LOVELAND, supra note 54, § 157, at 466.
59. See id. §§ 157-160, at 466-78.
60. See id. § 175, at 506 (citing Steele v. Buel, 104 F. 968 (8th Cir. 1900); In re
McDonnell, 101 F. 239 (N.D. Iowa 1900)).
61. See LOVELAND, supra note 54, § 175, at 506.
62. See id. § 153, at 460 ("[A]l goods, property and rights of action properly
available for the payment of the bankrupt's obligations or debts pass to the trus-
tee .... ).
63. 194 U.S. 296 (1904).
64. See Hewit, 194 U.S. at 300.
65. Under a conditional sales contract, the seller retains title to the property
sold until the purchaser pays the full purchase price, at which time title passes to
the buyer. See BLACK'S LAW DiCriONARY 295 (6th ed. 1990).
66. Hewit, 194 U.S. at 301 (internal quotations omitted).
67. See id. at 301-02.
6& See id. at 302.
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machinery into the estate. 69 Thus, once the bankruptcy petition was
filed against the debtor, the creditors were unable to reach assets
which they would have been able to reach if the petition had not been
filed.
Interestingly, the attorney for the trustee argued that "[t]he pol-
icy of the Bankrupt Act is to clothe the trustee with title as against
secret titles, liens and equities... and to give the trustee the protec-
tion which a purchaser in good faith or a creditor enjoys."7 The
Court rejected this argument, stating that the trustee "could not
claim as a subsequent purchaser in good faith.,
71
In York Manufacturing Co. v. Cassel72 the Court again faced a
conditional sales contract. Mount Vernon Ice, Coal, & Mining Com-
pany ("Mount Vernon") purchased ice-making machinery from York
Manufacturing Company ("York"). 73 The contract required install-
ment payments for the machinery, and it stipulated that title to the
machinery would not pass to Mount Vernon until the purchase price
was paid in full.'
The applicable state law provided that, unless a conditional sales
contract was filed with the town clerk, the contract would be void as
to subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors. However,
failure to file, would not render the contract void as between the par-
ties.76 Because York never filed the conditional sales contract with
the town clerk,' the contract, while valid between the parties, was
void as to Mount Vernon's creditors.
After purchasing the machinery, but before it was delivered,
Mount Vernon entered into an agreement with two third-parties,
Waight and Ames, whereby Waight and Ames became sureties on
notes given by Mount Vernon.78 At the same time, Mount Vernon
executed a chattel mortgage to Waight and Ames to indemnify
them for becoming sureties. Waight and Ames recorded this
mortgage after York delivered and installed the machinery at
Mount Vernon, but before Mount Vernon's creditors filed a
69. See id.
70. Id. at 298.
71. Id- at 303.
72. 201 U.S. 344 (1906).
73. See id. at 344.
74. See id&
75. See id. at 345 & n.1.
76. See id. at 351.
77. See id at 345.
78. See id at 345-46.
79. See id. at 346.
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bankruptcy petition against it. °
When the petition was filed, Mount Vernon had paid only
twenty-five percent of the purchase price to York." After the adjudi-
cation of bankruptcy, York petitioned the court for permission to
remove the machinery pursuant to the terms of the contract.8
Waight and Ames argued that they had had no knowledge of the
York contract and that their mortgage should be given priority over
York's claim.3
The Supreme Court noted that York's failure to file did not ren-
der the contract void as between the parties to the contract, York and
Mount Vernon, but only as to creditors who had a specific lien on the
machinery8' Because Waight and Ames did not have a lien on the
machinery,85 the Court addressed whether the adjudication in bank-
ruptcy was equivalent to a judgment, attachment, or other specific
lien upon the machinery. 6 The Court stated: "The trustee... stands
simply in the shoes of the bankrupt and as between them he has no
greater right than the bankrupt."' The Court held that York had the
right to take the property.
The foregoing cases reveal the weakness of the early bankruptcy
acts in dealing with secret liens and conveyances. If the debtor had
not been adjudged a bankrupt, the secret conveyances would have
been ineffective against the bankrupt's creditors. The creditors could
have reached the secretly-conveyed property to satisfy their claims.
Once the petition for bankruptcy was filed however, the credi-
tors could no longer pursue the bankrupt's assets-it was the respon-
sibility of the trustee to gather up these assets for distribution to
creditors. Because the trustee was vested solely with the title of the
bankrupt, and the secret liens and conveyances were effective as to
the bankrupt, the conveyances and liens were effective as to the trus-
tee and therefore against the creditors.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 345.
82 See id. at 346.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 351.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 350-51.
87. Id. at 352.
88. See id. at 353.
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B. The 1910 Amendments: The Trustee as Judicial Lien Creditor
In response to York Manufacturing Co., Congress added the
strong-arm powers to the Bankruptcy Act in 1910.89 Congress' impe-
tus was that the result of the York Manufacturing Co. holding was
that "creditors were prevented from setting aside a conveyance or
transfer that might be voidable as to them [under state law], because
the bankruptcy court had taken possession." 9 The amendments in-
validated, as to the bankruptcy trustee, an "unrecorded instrument
[of conveyance] ... which would have been void in the state courts
had the property been taken by the assignee or receiver of a state
court, or levied upon by attachment or execution from a state
court."9' In short, the amendment was "to prevent the evil of secret
liens."2 As amended, section 47a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act stated:
[T]rustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into
the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor hold-
ing a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and
also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy
court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution
* duly returned unsatisfied.93
One problem with the initial strong-arm clause was that it was
added to section 47a of the Bankruptcy Act, which set forth the
"Duties of Trustees."9'  There was, however, no corresponding
change to section 70 giving the trustee title to this property. This cre-
ated a potential conflict. The strong-arm powers were enacted to
overcome the limitations of section 70 by bringing into the estate
property which was subject to a secret lien or conveyance. If section
70 remained a limitation on the ability to bring property into the es-
tate, then the strong-arm powers would not benefit the estate at all.
Courts recognized the potential conflict between section 47 and
section 70 almost immediately9 but seemed to dismiss it as a minor
89. See 45 CONG. REc. 2271 (1910) ("On account of the decision in York
Manufacturing Company v. Cassell (201 U.S. 344), section 8 of the bill is pro-
posed."); H.R. REP. No. 61-511, at 6-7 (1910).
90. 45 CONG. REC. 2275 (1910).
91. Id. at 2271.
92- Id. at 2275.
93. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412 § 8, 36 Stat. 838, 840.
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 47, 30 Stat. 544, 557.
95. See, e.g., In re Hammond, 188 F. 1020, 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1911).
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drafting error. To overcome the potential conflict, the courts con-
strued the two sections together." "It cannot be assumed that Con-
gress would have added this amendment to section 47, if the una-
mended language of section 70 were to operate to neutralize the
amendment.""
In 1924 the Supreme Court addressed whether the strong-arm
powers allowed the trustee to include in the estate property acquired
by the debtor through fraud. Cunningham v. Brown" involved six
suits brought by the bankruptcy trustee of Charles Ponzi to recover
preferential payments.99 Ponzi borrowed money, purporting to invest
the money in international postal coupons."° Ponzi promised to re-
pay the notes at 150% of the purchase price in ninety days and at
100% if the notes were redeemed in less than forty-five days."0 '
Ponzi, in fact, made no investments of any kind and, as each note
held to maturity cost Ponzi more than he received, the scheme un-
raveled.1 2
The defendants in Cunningham were investors who, when the
scheme began to unravel, took advantage of Ponzi's offer to pay off
the notes at face value."' As a defense to the trustee's suits, the de-
fendants argued that they had rescinded their contracts for fraud and
were thus entitled to a return of their money.' °4 The Court rejected
this argument stating that the defendants merely took advantage of
Ponzi's agreement to pay his unmatured notes at face value. 5 The
Court concluded that the payments to the defendants were clearly
preferences which the trustee could avoid."°
The Court also outlined the remedies which would have been
available to the defendants had they, in fact, rescinded the contracts
for fraud. The defendants "could have followed the money wherever
96. See id. at 1021-22
(It seems that this language might have found a more appropnate place
in section 70 of the act; but, however that may be, it is pan hat the two
sections must now be construed together, and that the trustee can no
longer be said to have the limited titfle of the bankrupt.);
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 52, § 748, at 542.
97. In re Morris, 204 F. 770, 771 (2d Cir. 1913).
98. 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
99. See id. at 7.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 7-8.
102. See id. at 8.
103. See id. at 10.
104. See id. at 9.
105. See id. at 10.
106. See id.
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they could trace it and have asserted possession of it on the ground
that there was a resulting trust in their favor."' ' This, the Court
stated, would not violate the preference statute "because [the defen-
dants] then would have been endeavoring to get their own money,
and not money in the estate of the bankrupt."' ' Because it was im-
possible to trace the defendants' funds, a constructive trust or equi-
table lien could not have been fastened to the funds." Although the
statements are arguably dicta, they clearly expressed the Supreme
Court's opinion that the strong-arm clause did not reach property
which the debtor had acquired by fraud.
C. The 1938 Amendments
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1938, "0 moving the
strong-arm clause from section 47a to section 70c because it fit "more
logically" in section 70c."' Section 70c contained the trustee's de-
fenses and powers.1  Congress made minor changes to the text of the
strong-arm clause but did not change the substance.1 3
However, Congress did make significant changes in the trustee's
authority to void preferential transfers. Essentially, a preferential
transfer is a transfer of property by the debtor to a creditor which
allows the creditor to receive more than the recipient would have
from the bankruptcy estate." Prior to 1938, the trustee could avoid a
preferential transfer if the transfer was made less than four months
before the bankruptcy petition was filed."5 The four month period
would not expire until four months "after the date of the recording or
registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering
[was] required.""' 6
In Carey v. Donahue7 the debtor transferred real property to a
creditor more than four months before the debtor filed a petition in
bankruptcy.' However, the deed by which the real property was
transferred was not recorded until less than four months before the
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
111. H.R. REP. No. 75-1409, at 34 (1937).
112. See Chandler Act, § 70c, 52 Stat. at 881.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1409 at 34-35.
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
115. See Act of Feb. 5, 1903, cl. 487, sec. 13, § 60a, 32 Stat. 797, 799-800.
116. Id.
117. 240 U.S. 430 (1916).
118. See id at 432-33.
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petition was filed." 9 Under the applicable state law, unrecorded
deeds were invalid as to subsequent bona fide purchasers but valid as
to subsequent creditors."O The Supreme Court first concluded that
the unrecorded deed would have been valid as against the debtor's
creditors and was therefore not avoidable under the trustee's strong-
arm powers.12 ' The Court stated that the unrecorded deed would be
valid "as against any class of persons represented by the trustee or
with whose 'rights, remedies, and powers' he was to be deemed to be
vested" under the trustee's strong-arm powers."
The Court then looked to see whether the transfer was voidable
as a preferential transfer. If the transfer was "required to be re-
corded," as provided in the preference clause, then the transfer
would have been a preference. The Court noted that "subsequent
purchasers are entirely outside of the purview of the bankruptcy
act. ' 3 Additionally, the Court stated that the restriction to transfers
which are required to be recorded should not be taken as "an artifi-
cial one by which the rights of creditors are made to depend upon the
presence or absence of local restrictions adopted.., in the interest of
others."'2 4 The Court concluded that a transfer is required to be re-
corded if it is required to be transferred for the protection of credi-
tors.' 25
In several other cases, the Supreme Court similarly interpreted
the preference clause very restrictively. 126 In Bailey v. Baker Ice Ma-
chine Company" the debtor purchased machinery under a condi-
tional sales contract more than four months before the bankruptcy
petition was filed.1'2 The contract was recorded less than four months
prior to the petition being filed.' 29 Under applicable state law, a
conditional sales contract was void as against a creditor who fastens a
lien on the property before the contract is recorded. ' 30 Because no
119. See id. at 433.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 434.
122. Id
123. Id. at 438.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Bunch v. Maloney, 246 U.S. 658 (1918); Martin v. The Commer-
cial Bank, 245 U.S. 513 (1918); Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268
(1915); Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
127. 239 U.S. 268 (1915).
128. See id. at 269.
129. See id. at 270.
130. See id. at 275.
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creditor had fastened a lien on the property prior to the bankruptcy
petition, the Court held that the transfer could not be voided as a
preference.13 ' The Court also held that since the trustee obtained the
status of a lien creditor on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed,
which was after the contract was recorded, the transfer could not be
avoided under the trustee's strong-arm powers.3
Congress amended the preference clause in 1938 to address the
restrictions of these cases. 3 The amendment provided that a transfer
was deemed to have been made "when it became so far perfected
that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could
thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred su-
perior to the rights of the transferee. '' =
When the 1938 amendments.were being considered, concern was
expressed that the trustee's role under the Bankruptcy Act was to
protect creditors and not purchasers, and that giving the trustee such
status would have a fatal effect on many methods of secured financ-
ing.135 Proponents of the amendment felt that such concern was un-
warranted based on prior Supreme Court decisions.136 As was to turn
out, the critics' concern was warranted.
In Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v. Klau-
der,' a bank had made loans to the debtor and, at the same time,
taken an assignment of the debtor's accounts receivable as collat-
eral. 38 Under applicable law, the failure to give notice of the assign-
ment to the account debtors would allow a subsequent good-faith
assignee who gives such notice to acquire a right superior to the
bank.1 39 Neither the bank nor the debtor gave notice of the assign-
ment to the debtors whose accounts were taken as security."' Read-
ing section 60 literally, the Court stated: "[Section 60's] apparent
command is to test the effectiveness of a transfer, as against the trustee,
131. See id. at 276.
132. See id.
133. See H.R. REP. No. 81-1293, at 4-5 (1949).
134. Chandler Act, § 60a, 52 Stat. at 869.
135. See Amending the Bankruptcy Act (Sections 60 and 70): Hearings on H.R.
2412 and H.R. 5834 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 7 (1948) (statement of Milton P.
Kupfer, Chairman, ABA Committee on Amendment of Section 60a, Bankruptcy
Act) [hereinafter Hearings on Amending the Bankruptcy Act 1].
136. See id. at 8.
137. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
138. See id. at 435.
139. See id. at 436.
140. See id. at 434.
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by the standards which applicable state law would enforce against a
good-faith purchaser., 14 Because notice was not given, the transfer
was not perfected under state law and the transfer was not effective
under section 60 as to the trustee.142 The transfers were deemed to
have occurred immediately prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion."4' Thus, the Court held that the assignments were preferential
transfers which the trustee could avoid.1"
D. The 1950 Amendments
The 1938 amendments went beyond remedying the problems
created by the Supreme Court.145 The amendments, by giving the
trustee in the status of a bona fide purchaser, invalidated many oth-
erwise valid liens, acquired in good faith and for value. 46 One of the
drafters of the 1938 amendments to the preference clause was Profes-
sor MacLachlan of Harvard Law School. 47 In hearings on the 1950
amendments, Professor MacLachlan expressed his opinion that the
1938 amendments had overreached their original purpose.'48 The
drafters of the 1938 amendments were relying on the courts applica-
tion of a strict construction to the Bankruptcy Act.'49 In interpreting
the 1938 amendments, the courts instead took a liberal view of the
word "purchaser."" Professor MacLachlan stated: "I cannot see the
theoretical justification for allowing the trustee to take advantage of
the rights of the bona fide purchaser, because he is just not a bona
fide purchaser..'.'.
In drafting the 1950 amendments, Congress sought to accomplish
141. Id. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
142. See id. at 437.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See H.R. RiEp. No. 81-1293, at 5 (1949).
146. See id.
147. See Discharge of Taxes in Bankruptcy: Hearing on S. 976 (H.R. 3438) Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong. 52 (1965) (Statement of James A.
MacLachlan); Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 6439 and H.R.
8046 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 120-31 (1937). In the
1937 Hearings, Professor MacLachlan's last name is given as McLaughlin. Pro-
fessor MacLachlan formally changed his name in 1948. See Amending the Bank-
ruptcy Act (Sections 60 and 70): Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 55 (1949) (statement of James A. MacLach-
Ian) [hereinafter Hearings on Amending the Bankruptcy Act II].
148. Hearings on Amending the Bankruptcy Act II, supra note 147, at 49.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Hearings on Amending the Bankruptcy Act II, supra note 147, at 54.
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the objectives of the 1938 amendments but "eliminate the evil of al-
lowing a trustee in bankruptcy to take the position of a potential and
artificial bona fide purchaser, and restore him to the position of a lien
creditor, in harmony with his functions under the Bankruptcy Act.,
152
Section 60a was amended to differentiate between a transfer of real
property and a transfer of other types of property. A transfer of
property other than real property was deemed to occur when no sub-
sequent lien holder could obtain superior rights. 53 Because commer-
cial financing transactions did not usually involve real property, the
reference to "bona fide purchaser" was not changed for transfers of
real estate.' 5 Transfers of real property were still deemed to occur
when a bona fide purchaser could not obtain rights superior to the
transferee.55
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Commission Bill
The trustee's strong-arm powers remained essentially unchanged
until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19785' ("Bankruptcy Code" or
"Code"). The Bankruptcy Code was the first comprehensive over-
haul of the bankruptcy laws in eighty years.'7 As might be expected
in an undertaking of this magnitude, the process took time. The
transition was gradual, with the proposed bills going through many
revisions and incarnations.
Congress began the process of reforming the Bankruptcy Act in
1968.5' First, Congress established a commission to study the then-
existing bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Commission" or
"Commission").'59 The Commission submitted its report, containing
a draft of a proposed bill ("Commission Bill"), to Congress on July
31, 1973.'6 The Commission Bill was introduced in the 93rd Congress
152. H.R. REP. No. 81-1293, at 6.
153. See Act of Mar. 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 60a, 64 Stat. 24, 25.
154. See Hearings on Amending the Bankruptcy Act H, supra note 147, at 53.
155. See id.
156. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
157. See 1 Alan N. Resnick & Eugene M. Wypyski, Preface to BANKRUPTCY
REFORM Acr OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Alan N. Resnick & Eugene
M. Wypyski eds. 1979).
158. See S.J. Res. 100, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
159. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354,84 Stat. 468.
160. See Commission Report, supra note 2.
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as House Bill 10792 and Senate Bill 2565.16' The National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges disagreed with many of the provisions of the
Commission Bill and proposed an alternative bill (the "Judges Bill").
The Judges Bill was introduced in the 93rd Congress as House Bill
16643.62 While the Commission Bill and the Judges Bill differed in
many aspects, they both contained essentially the same provisions re-
garding the property of the estate and the trustee's strong-arm pow-
ers.1
63
1. Property of the estate
The Commission Bill's definition of property of the estate was
derived from section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act.16" However, because
the Commission sought to remedy some of the problems in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the Commission Bill departed from the Bankruptcy Act
in several regards.
The Bankruptcy Act relied heavily on state law to define the
property interests which became part of the estate.165 This resulted in
the application of inconsistent standards to different interests to de-
termine whether the property became part of the estate.' Generally,
the trustee was vested with title to property that the debtor could
transfer or was leviable under state law.167 However, certain rights
of action would only pass to the trustee if they were subject to judi-
cial process." Other property interests would pass to the trustee
regardless of transferability or vulnerability to creditor's process.' 69
Relying on state law often led to illogical distinctions in the
treatment of property. For example, if a debtor's interest in a future
estate was transferable, it passed to the trustee and could be sold
161. See 119 CONG. REc. 33,430 (1973) (introduction of House Bill 10792); id.
33,795 (introduction of Senate Bill 2565).
162 See 120 CONG. REc. 30,969 (1974) (introduction of House Bill 10792).
163. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 94th Cong., app. at 163-87 (1976) (comparing the text of House Bill 31
and House Bill 32). Because the Commission Bill and the Judges Bill were very
similar with regard to the property of the estate and the strong arm provisions,
this Comment discusses only the Commission Bill.
164. Commission Report, supra note 2, pt. II, § 4-601 note 1 at 148.
165. See id. pt. I, at 15.
166. See id. at 15-16.
167. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70a(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed
1978); see also Commission Report, supra note 2, pt. I, at 15-16.
168. See Bankruptcy Act, § 70a(5); see also Commission Report, supra note 2,
pt. I, at 16.
169. See Commission Report, supra note 2, pt. I, at 16.
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even if its value was minimal and the hardship on the debtor was un-
conscionable.170 At the same time, a valuable interest in an estate by
the entirety that was not severable under state law did not pass to the
trustee."' Relying on state law also resulted in inconsistent treatment
of property in different states. Because each state had its own prop-
erty laws, certain categories of property would become part of the es-
tate in one state but not in another.'2
To remedy these problems, the Commission recommended that
"[t]he property of the estate be defined in the act comprehensively and
that the tests of transferability and leviability under state law be
abandoned."'7' The Commission defined property of the estate to
have a broad sweep. 74 The Commission Bill stated: "The following
is property of the estate: (1) all property of the debtor as of the date
of the petition... (3) property recovered pursuant to section 4-603 to
4-608 inclusive and section 4-610 . ,,.." Section 4-603 dealt with
property of the debtor in the hands of a custodian.1 76 Sections 4-604
through 4-608 contained the trustee's avoidance powers."
2. The strong-arm clause
As to the strong-arm power, the Bankruptcy Commission stated:
"One of the essential features of any bankruptcy law is the inclusion
of provisions designed to invalidate secret transfers made by the bank-
rupt prior to the date of filing the petition. ... ,,1 The Commission
recommended that the strong-arm clause be continued with
"simplifying language" and language which clarified that the trustee's
rights and powers were not affected by the trustee's or any of the
creditors' knowledge about the transfers to be avoided.'79
The strong-arm clause of the Commission Bill, section 4-604, es-
sentially carried over the strong-arm clause from section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act.'o The trustee was vested with "the rights and
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
174. See id. pt. II, at 150.
175. Id- § 4-601(a), at 147.
176. See id. § 4-603(b), at 159.
177. See id. §§ 4-604 to 4-608, at 160-78.
178. Id. pt. I, at 18 (emphasis added). The Commission cited sections 60, 67d,
70c, and 70e of the Bankruptcy Act as the provisions which dealt with these
problems. See id.
179. Id. at 200.
180. See id. pt. II, § 4-604 note 1, at 160.
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powers of a judicial lien creditor of the debtor and of a creditor with
an execution returned unsatisfied against the debtor. 181
The Commission did, however, make some changes to the
strong-arm clause. In the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee was given the
rights and powers of a creditor who obtained a judgment on the date
of bankruptcy.l" This status was discarded in the Commission Bill
because the Commission deemed it unnecessary.n The Bankruptcy
Act also provided that "a transfer.., valid in part against the credi-
tors whose rights and powers are conferred upon the trustee ... shall
be valid to a like extent against the trustee."' This clause was in-
tended to preserve the part of a security interest that was perfected as
to some but not all of the collateral." Because the trustee only had
the power as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor to avoid the unper-
fected part, the "saving clause" of the Bankruptcy Act was deemed
unnecessary.' The Commission Bill made clear that the trustee's
status was purely hypothetical and was not affected by the knowledge
of the trustee or any of the creditors."n
B. House Bill 6
The Commission Bill and the Judges Bill, in various incarna-
tions, were the subject of extensive hearings in both the House and
Senate.1" These hearings resulted in the drafting of single bill, House
Bill 6,189 which was introduced in the 95th Congress.19 House Bill 6
contained substantial organizational changes from the prior bills and
introduced the Bankruptcy Code's structure and numbering scheme.
181. Id. § 4-604(a), at 160-61.
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
183. See Commission Report, supra note 2, pt. II, § 4-504 note 2, at 160 (citing
Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I1), 47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 649 (1972); Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REv. 149, 166-69 (1967))
184. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)(3) (1976) (repealed 1978).
185. See Commission Report, supra note 2, pt. II, § 4-604 note 2, at 161.
186. See id. (citing Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1
GA. L. REv. 149, 169-70 (1967)).
187. See id. § 4-604 note 3, at 161.
188. See 1 Resnick & Wypyski, supra note 157, Preface. Despite the scope of
these hearings, very little light was shed on the operation of the strong-arm and
property of the estate provisions.
189. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977).
190. See 123 CONG. REc. 125 (1977).
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1. The property of the estate
House Bill 6 included some minor changes to the "property of
the estate" provision which made the language more specific. Prior
bills had simply stated that "[t]he following is property of the estate"
and then enumerated the property which became part of the estate.19'
Section 541 of House Bill 6 stated that the commencement of a bank-
ruptcy case creates an estate and "[s]uch estate is comprised of the
following property."'" Additionally, instead of the general statement
that the estate includes "[a]ll property of the debtor, ' 193 House Bill 6
used the more specific statement that the estate includes "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property."'94
Earlier bills had included in the estate "[p]roperty recovered
pursuant to [the trustee's avoidance powers]" by directly referring to
the sections of the bill containing those avoidance powers. 95 House
Bill 6 instead included in the estate "[a]ny interest in property that
the trustee recovers under section... 550. ' ,196 Section 550 then gave
the trustee the power to recover property if the transfer of that prop-
erty was avoided pursuant to the trustee's avoidance powers."
2. The strong-arm clause
During hearings on Senate Bills 235 and 236, Professor Vern
Countryman noted that the proposed strong-arm clause permitted
the trustee, as the representative of the creditors, to only avoid trans-
fers which were avoidable by an unsecured creditor. 98 Professor
Countryman noted that the Uniform Commercial Code and most
state real estate perfection laws do not protect unsecured creditors. 99
The trustee would, therefore, be unable to avoid transfers pursuant
to the strong-arm clause. Although there is no legislative history to
so indicate, Professor Countryman's concerns appear to have worked
their way in to the strong-arm clause of House Bill 6.
191. See, e.g., H.R. 31, 94th Cong. § 4-601(a) (1976).
192. H.R. 6, § 541(a).
193. H.R. 31, § 4-601(a).
194. H.R. 6, § 541(a)(1).
195. See H.R. 31, § 4-601(a)(3) (1976).
196. H.R. 6, § 541(a)(3) (1977).
197. See id. § 550.
198. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act" Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1040 (statement of Ven Countryman) (1975) [hereinafter
Hearings on The Bankruptcy Reform Act].
199. See id. (Statement of Vern Countryman)(citing IV AMERICAN LAW &
PROPERTY § 17.9 (Casner ed. 1952)).
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The strong-arm clause of House Bill 6 granted the trustee "rights
and powers," as well as the ability to "avoid any transfer of property
of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor."M House Bill
6 also added to the trustee's status as a hypothetical creditor, the
status of a bona fide purchaser of real property."
There is little legislative history to explain these changes to the
strong-arm clause.2 The only explanation for the addition of the
trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser is that it is new.'° The ex-
planation for the addition of the trustee's avoidance powers is simi-
larly cryptic: "The avoiding powers under section 544(a)(1), (2), and
(3) are new. ' 'a '
C. House Bill 8200
After further amendments and additional technical, drafting, and
style corrections, House Bill 6 was re-introduced in the 95th Congress
as House Bill 8200.205 After further amendments, House Bill 8200
would eventually be enacted into law as the Bankruptcy Code.'
Senate Bill 2266, a bill analogous to House Bill 8200,2 was intro-
duced in the Senate.' The Senate added section 541(e) to Senate Bill
2266 which provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this sec-
tion [541] and section 544, a mortgage secured by real prop-
erty, or an interest in such a mortgage sold by the debtor but
of which the debtor has retained legal title for the purpose of
servicing, or supervising the servicing of, the mortgage or an
interest therein shall be deemed property held by the debtor
for the benefit of the owner or holder of such mortgage or in-
terest therein and shall not become property of the estate.2
The Senate Committee report stated that this new section "confirms
the current status under the Bankruptcy Act of bona fide secondary
200. H.R. 6, § 544(a).
201. See id. § 544(a)(3).
202. See In re Mill Concepts, 123 B.R. 938, 942 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
203. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 370, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6326.
204. 124 CONG. REc. 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
205. See 123 CONG. REc. 22,183 (1977).
206. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549.
207. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5788.
208. See 123 CONG. REc. 36,095 (1977).
209. S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 541(e) (1978).
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mortgage market transactions as the purchase and sale of assets.,
210
The report also stated that this section "makes clear that the seller's
retention of the mortgage documents and the purchaser's decision not
to record do not impair the asset sale character of secondary mort-
gage market transactions.
211
The strong-arm powers would normally allow the trustee to re-
cover any unrecorded transfer of an interest in real property.212 The
proposed amendment would thus have acted as an absolute exemp-
tion to sections 541 and 544 for secondary mortgage market transac-
tions. The Senate subsequently substituted the text of Senate Bill
2266 into House Bill 8200.213
The House moved the Senate's section 541(e) to section 541(d)
and amended it to read:
Property in which the debtor holds... only legal title and
not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real
property, or an interest in such mortgage, sold by the debtor
but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service or su-
pervise the servicing of such mortgage or interest, becomes
property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section
[541] only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such
property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in
such property that the debtor does not hold.1
While the Senate version was a narrowly tailored exception for
the secondary mortgage market, the House version excepted from
the property of the estate all property where "the debtor holds...
only legal title and not an equitable interest., 215 Section 541(d) ap-
peared to act as a restriction on the strong-arm powers also.
When introducing this amendment to House Bill 8200, Repre-
sentative Edwards explained that this provision "reiterates the gen-
eral principle that where the debtor holds bare legal title without any
equitable interest, that the estate acquires bare legal title without any
equitable interest in the property."2 '6 This would appear to indicate
210. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5869.
211. Id. at 84, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5870 (emphasis added).
212. See Richard B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 175-76 (1979); supra Part III.B.2.
213. See 124 CONG. REc. 28,254-82 (1978).
214. 124 CONG. REG. 32,363 (1978).
215. Id.
216. 124 CONG. Re. 32,399 (1978) (Statement of Don Edwards upon intro-
ducing the House amendment to the Senate amendment to House Bill 8200).
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that the House intended section 541(d) to emphasize that section
541(a) was limited by its own terms as to which property interests it
brought into the estate.
The strong-arm clause was originally enacted because the trus-
tee's power over the estate property was limited to the same power
the debtor had.2 " The House amendment, thus, appeared to negate
the trustee's strong-arm powers. However, Representative Edwards
further explained:
Thus, as section 541(a)(1) clearly states, the estate is com-
prised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case. To the ex-
tent such an interest is limited in the hands of the debtor, it
is equally limited in the hands of the estate ... .."
Representative Edwards' reference to section 541(a)(1) indicates that
the new section was intended to only limit the property included in
the estate under this section. Such an application is consistent with
the Bankruptcy Act, in which the trustee's title to property was lim-
ited to that of the debtor, but through the strong-arm clause the trus-
tee was able to bring into the estate interests that the debtor's credi-
tors could reach.
F. The 1984 Amendments
Congress apparently became aware of the textual conflict between
§ 541(d) and § 544 shortly after passing the Bankruptcy Code. In 1979,
just one year after Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code, a bill was in-
troduced in the Senate to correct technical errors and clarify the
Code. 9 That bill addressed the "inevitabl[e] errors and omissions"
and was "basically one of technical and conforming type amendments
that.., reflect the congressional intent that may not always have been
clear regarding the Code."m In 1980, the House version of this bill pro-
posed to amend § 541(d) by "inserting '(1)' immediately after [the]
'(a)'."' ' When finally enacted into law in 1984, the amendment was
modified slightly so that § 541(d) referred to "§ 541(a)(1) or (2)" and
217. See supra Part III.B.2.
218. 124 CONG. REc. 32,399 (1978) (Statement of Don Edwards upon intro-
ducing the House amendment to the Senate amendment to House Bill 8200)
(emphasis added).
219. See 125 CONG. REc. 5027 (1979) (introducing Senate Bill 658).
220. 126 CONG. REc. 31,152 (1980) (statements of Senator DeConcini)
(emphasis added).
221. 126 CONG. Rac. 26,489 (1980).
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not just § 541(a)(1), as originally introduced.
The amendment to § 541(d) was intended to "make[] clear the
cross-reference with respect to which property of the debtor becomes
property of the estate."m As amended, "the exclusion of equitable
interests from the estate, as required by § 541(d) applies only to the
estate considered ab initio.' ' A
V. THE TEXT OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. Section 541: The Property of the Estate
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the property of
the estate as "comprised of all the following property, wherever lo-
cated and by whomever held.''t s Section 541(a) then enumerates
seven categories of property which comprise the estate. The two
categories of import to this Comment are "all legal or equitable in-
terests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case,"' ' 6 and "[a]ny interest in property that the trustee recovers un-
der section... 550... of this title. ''tm
In Belisle v. Plunkettm the court concluded that property could
enter the estate through sections of the Bankruptcy Code other than
§ 541.m The Bankruptcy Act conveyed title of the debtor's property
to the trustee by operation of law. Instead of conveying title to the
trustee, the Bankruptcy Code simply provided that certain property
became property of the estate. The legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code reveals that this change was only grammatical and was
not a change in what property was property of the estate. Therefore,
for the Belisle decision to be correct the text of the Bankruptcy Code
must show an unambiguous change in the prior law.
The key to this determination is the term "comprise". Comprise
is synonymous with include. 1 There are, however, minor differences
222- See H.R. REP. No. 98-882, at 47 (1984).
223. H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, at 16 (1980).
224. Mills v. Brown (In re Brown), 182 B.R. 778,780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995)
(citing Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. (In re Granada, Inc.), 92 B.R. 501, 508
(Bankr. D. Utah 1988)).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
226. Id. § 541(a)(1).
227. Id. § 541(a)(3).
228. 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).
229. See id. at 515.
230. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 30 Stat. 544, 565.
231. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 913 (3d ed. 1992).
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between the two: "Comprise usually implies that all of the compo-
nents are stated .... Include... more often implies an incomplete
listing." "When one wants to make clear that the listing is exhaus-
tive, however, the use of comprise [instead of include] ... will avoid
ambiguity."'  This distinction between include and comprise is con-
sistent with their usage in the Bankruptcy Code.
In the Bankruptcy Code include is not limiting.' While the use
of include may indicate that all of the components are listed, it is not
necessarily so. In American Surety Co. v. Marottus the Court stated:
"It is plain that 'shall include' ... cannot reasonably be read to be the
equivalent of 'shall mean' or 'shall include only. ' '' 16 American Surety
involved the distinction between"include" and "mean" in the Bank-
ruptcy Act.2 The Court's conclusion, however, applies equally to the
distinction between include and comprise: "When the section as a
whole is regarded, it is evident that these verbs are not used synony-
mously or loosely, but with discrimination and a purpose to give to
each a meaning not attributable to the other.' ' 8
That Congress did not mean include when it used the term com-
prise is further evidenced by the number of times Congress used in-
clude and comprise in the Bankruptcy Code. Include appears in sev-
enty-four sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 However, there is only
a single use of comprise.240 Thus, looking at the Bankruptcy Code as a
whole, it is evident that Congress did not use these verbs synono-
mously.
The court's conclusion in Belisle may be because of § 541(d). In
Belisle the court applied the pre-1984 version of § 541(d) which stated
that property in which the debtor holds only legal but not equitable
title becomes part of the estate under § 541(a) only to the extent of
232 Id.
233. Id.
234. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1994).
235. 287 U.S. 513 (1933). The American Surety Company holding was codified
in § 102(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 28 (1978); H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 316 (1977).
236. American Surety Co., 287 U.S. at 517.
237. Id. at 516-17.
238. Id. at 517.
239. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, USCODE File (Sept. 23, 1997) (search
for records containing "TITLE 11" in the HEADING field and "INCLUD!" in
the TEXT field).
240. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, USCODE File (Sept. 23, 1997) (search
for records containing "TITLE 11" in the HEADING field and "COMPRIS!" in
the TEXT field).
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the legal title.24' If § 541(a) is the sole means by which property en-
ters the estate, property interests which the trustee recovers pursuant
to the strong-arm powers become property of the estate under §
541(a)(3). 242 The pre-1984 version of § 541(d) would have negated
the strong-arm clause. Therefore, the court faced a dilemma: either
§ 541(d) did not mean what it said or § 541(a) was not the sole means
by which property could enter the estate. The Belisle court, like a
majority of courts, concluded the latter.43
The 1984 amendments appear to have cured the conflict between
§ 541(d) and § 544. However, courts, relying on the pre-1984 cases,
still permit property to enter the estate outside of § 541(a).2' Courts
must recognize the constraints under which the pre-1984 courts were
operating in interpreting § 541. Those constraints no longer apply,
and the pre-1984 cases should not be relied on as valid precedent.
The text of § 541(a) clearly indicates that it is an exhaustive list
of property interests which become the bankruptcy estate. To the ex-
tent that there is an ambiguity in the text of the Code, the pre-Code
law and the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code lead to the
same conclusion-§ 541(a) is the exclusive means by which property
can enter the bankruptcy estate.
B. Section 544: The Strong-Arm Clause
The strong-arm clause of the Bankruptcy Code, § 544, provides:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case,
and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of
any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-(1) a creditor that... ob-
tains.., a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor
on a simple contract could have obtained ... a judicial
241. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 541(d)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1994)). The pre-1984 version of §
541(d) provided:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the
case, only legal title and not an equitable interest .... becomes property
of the estate under subsection (a) of this section only to the extent of the
debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equita-
ble interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.
Id. (emphasis added).
242- See infra Part V.B.
243. See In re General Coffee Corp., 828 F.2d 699,705 (11th Cir. 1987).
244. See, e.g., National Bank v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express Corp.), 912
F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1990).
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lien. ..;.. or (3) a bona fide purchaser of real property...
from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected ....245
To focus on those portions of § 544 that are relevant to the trus-
tee's status as a bona fide purchaser of real property, § 544 can be
rewritten as:
The trustee shall have the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obliga-
tion incurred by the debtor that is voidable by a bona fide
purchaser of real property from the debtor, against whom
applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that
obtains the status of bona fide purchaser and has perfected
such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case.
In short, § 544(a) grants the trustee certain authority that is de-
rived from certain hypothetical categories of persons.246 The analysis
that follows is divided into two issues. First, what is the trustee's
authority? Second, from what category of persons is it derived?
1. The trustee's authority
In the Bankruptcy Act, the strong-arm clause stated that the
trustee has the "rights and powers" of certain creditors.247 These
rights and powers included the power to avoid transfers. The Bank-
ruptcy Code gives the trustee, in addition to certain rights and pow-
ers, the ability to "avoid transfers." 248 The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code does not reveal any clear intention of Congress to
change the trustee's strong-arm powers. 9 Since the Bankruptcy
Code specifically conferred upon the trustee the ability to void trans-
fers, the trustee's rights and powers under the Code do not appear to
include the avoidance powers; otherwise the clause that gives the
trustee the ability to avoid transfers would be superfluous.
The use of "or" in defining the scope of the trustee's authority
indicates that the trustee may either exercise the rights and powers of
a bona fide purchaser or avoid a transfer that is voidable by a bona
245. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994). Although not relevant to this Comment, the
strong-arm clause also gives the trustee the rights and powers of a creditor with a
writ of execution on the debtor's property, see id. § 544(a)(2), and the power to
avoid transfers of interests in the debtors property that an unsecured creditor
could avoid under non-bankruptcy law. See id. § 544(b).
246. Id. § 544(a).
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970) (repealed 1978).
248. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
249. See supra Part IV.
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fide purchaser or both.' The "power to avoid any transfer of prop-
erty of the debtor that is voidable by a bona fide purchaser is in addi-
tion to the trustee's ... position of having the 'rights and powers' of a
bona fide purchaser."' ' Generally, the courts seem to agree with this
rule when considering the trustee's status as a lien creditor. 2
However, the courts reach different results when they consider
the trustee's bona fide purchaser status. In In re Mill Concepts
Corp.23 the court noted that the trustee's rights and powers were
separate from the trustee's ability to avoid transfers insofar as the
trustee's status as a creditor2" However, the court concluded that
the trustee's rights and powers had no application to the trustee's
bona fide purchaser status. z5 This conclusion is inconsistent with the
text of § 544. Section 544 grants the trustee the rights and powers of
three categories of persons, and the ability to avoid transfers which
are voidable by these categories of persons.
In Belisle v. Plunkett,26 the court also recognized that the
grant of rights and powers to the trustee and the grant of the abil-
ity to avoid transfers were separate grants. m As to the trustee's
bona fide purchaser status, the court stated: "Section 544(a)(3)
allows the trustee to have a bona fide purchaser's rights or avoid a
transfer, so a 'transfer' by the debtor cannot be a necessary
condition of the exercise of the strong-arm power." '
The apparent argument of the Belisle court is that if a bona fide
purchaser would have taken the property free of a claimed interest,
then the trustee's rights and powers as a bona fide purchaser include
250. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 315 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6272 ("[I]f a party 'may do (a) or (b),' then the party may do either or
both.").
251. In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. at 505; see also In re Mill Concepts Corp., 123
B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) ("It also seems apparent from the wording
and placement of commas that the grant of 'rights and powers' and the grant of
the ability to avoid a transfer are separate grants.").
252. See, e.g., Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Section
544(a)(3) allows the trustee to have a bona fide purchaser's rights or avoid a
transfer.... ."); In re Mill Concepts Corp., 123 B.R. at 941 ("It... seems appar-
ent from the wording and placement of commas that the grant of 'rights and
powers' and the grant of the ability to avoid a transfer are separate grants.").
253. 123 B.R. 938 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
254. See id. at 941.
255. See id. at 941-42 ("Use of 'or' solidifies the existence of the single avoid-
ance function of subparagraph (3).").
256. 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).
257. See id. at 515.
25& Id.
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the power to take the property free of that claim. Under such an in-
terpretation, the trustee would have no need to avoid transfers of
property." The text of the strong-arm clause which specifically gives
the trustee the power to avoid transfers would therefore be superflu-
ous.
2. The scope of the trustee's authority
The scope of the trustee's authority is defined with respect to
three categories of persons. The first two categories, carried over
from the Bankruptcy Act, give the trustee the status of certain hypo-
thetical creditors.' The third category, contained in § 544(a)(3), is
that of a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor.26' By
giving the trustee a status that the trustee did not have under the
Bankruptcy Act, Congress has clearly made a change from the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The question becomes: By how much did Congress in-
tend to change the law?
Under § 544(a)(3) the trustee's authority is that of "a bona fide
purchaser of real property.., from the debtor, against whom appli-
cable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the
status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the
time of the commencement of the case."' 2 In Belisle the court con-
cluded that a transfer of property was not a necessary condition to
the trustee's exercise of the strong-arm power.2 63 The court stated:
"The statute mentions 'transfer' only in the sense of the hypothetical
transfer that measures the trustee's rights."2" The court's statement
only refers to the hypothetical transfer to the trustee. But the trus-
tee's status as hypothetical bona fide purchaser is qualified as a bona
fide purchaser "against whom applicable law permits such transfer to
be perfected."2' Thus, § 544(a)(3) presumes two transfers: a transfer
to the trustee as a bona fide purchaser, and a transfer against which
the trustee's status is measured.
The necessity of transfer by which to judge the trustee's status is
259. For example, assume the debtor sold a parcel of real property to a pur-
chaser, but the transfer was not recorded. If the debtor then sells that same par-
cel to a bona fide purchaser, the second purchaser would take the property free
of the first purchaser's claim.
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
261. See id. § 544(a)(3).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
263. See supra Part V.B.1.
264. See Belisle, 877 F.2d at 515.
265. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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shown in In re Michael."6 The debtors in In re Michael had not yet
recorded a declaration of homestead under state law at the time they
filed their bankruptcy petition and did not list their home as exempt
property in their bankruptcy filing.27 After their debt was dis-
charged, the debtors recorded a declaration of homestead and at-
tempted to amend their bankruptcy filing to list their home as ex-
empt property.m If the debtors had transferred their home to a bona
fide purchaser, that purchaser would take the home free of all home-
stead rights.29 The trustee argued that his status as a bona fide pur-
chaser allowed him to defeat the homestead exemption."° The court
held that since it was impossible for the debtor to perfect the home-
stead exemption against a subsequent purchaser, § 544(a)(3) pre-
vented the trustee from defeating the homestead exemption.2'
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that "section
544(a)(3) permits the trustee to assume the status of a bona fide pur-
chaser with respect to a particular transfer only if 'applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected' against a bona fide pur-
chaser." m The court stated: "It is clear that in enacting [§ 544(a)(3)],
Congress intended to prevent the trustee from using his powers as
bona fide purchaser to defeat interests which by their very nature
could never be perfected against such a purchaser .... "
Under Belisle, the trustee's rights and powers as a bona fide pur-
chaser allows the trustee to defeat claims which a bona fide purchaser
could defeat. Since a bona fide purchaser would take the property
free of the homestead exemption, the trustee would do the same. In
re Michael shows that it is not sufficient to simply say that the trustee
is a bona fide purchaser and that a transfer of the debtor's property is
not required. The text of § 544(a)(3) requires a transfer of the
debtor's property against which to determine the trustee's bona fide
purchaser status.
The trustee's avoidance powers in § 544(a) specifically refer to a
transfer. The reference to a transfer in § 544(a)(3) does not therefore
pose a problem. But the trustee's rights and powers as a bona fide
purchaser are the rights and powers of a bona fide purchaser, against
266. Michael v. Martinson (In re Michael), 49 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1995).
267. See id. at 500.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 501.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 502.
272. Id. at 501.
273. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
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whom such a transfer can be perfected. Without a reference to a
transfer in defining the trustee's fights and powers in § 544(a), there
is no transfer against which to determine the trustee's fights and
powers as a bona fide purchaser. The text of § 544(a), thus, presents
a question: Is a transfer required for the trustee to exercise the rights
and powers of a bona fide purchaser?
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
This Comment demonstrates that trustee's strong-arm powers
preclude including in the estate property acquired by the debtor
through fraud. Courts should recognize the mistakes made by courts
in applying the strong-arm powers and not repeat them, or rely on
them as precedent. Instead courts should follow the dictates of the
Supreme Court. This requires looking at the pre-Code and then de-
termining whether the legislative history or the text of the Bank-
ruptcy Code indicates a change in the law.
But it is not sufficient to merely hope that courts will apply a
correct analysis in future cases. Congress must amend the Bank-
ruptcy Code to make clear that the trustee's bona fide purchaser
status can only be used to recover, for the benefit of the estate, prop-
erty interests transferred by the debtor. To accomplish this, the fol-
lowing amendments are suggested.
A. The Property of the Estate
When the Bankruptcy Act was first enacted, a single section de-
fined the property that became the estate and the trustee's powers
with respect to that property.2 4 When the strong-arm clause was en-
acted this changed. The trustee's strong-arm powers were contained
in a section that defined the trustee's duties, as opposed to the trus-
tee's fights with respect to property.25 This discrepency was subse-
quently corrected and, once again, a single section of the Bankruptcy
Act defined the property of the estate and the trustee's fights and
powers with respect to property which was, or was to become, part of
the estate. 6
In the Bankruptcy Code, the property that becomes the bank-
ruptcy estate is defined in a section separate from the section that
defines the trustee's fights and powers with respect to property.m
274. See supra Part III.A.
275. See supra Part III.B.
276. See supra Part III.C.
277. See supra Part V.
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However, the two sections remain inextricably linked. The Code
specifically defines the estate to include property recovered pursuant
to the trustee's avoidance powers, including the strong-arm powers.2'
That § 541 is the sole means by which property becomes part of
the bankruptcy estate is also evidenced by the text of the Code. Sec-
tion 541 provides that the estate "is comprised of" the enumerated
interests." The use of "comprise" indicates that the list is exhaus-
tive-any property interest not contained in the list does not become
part of the estate.m
Despite the unambiguous text of § 541, courts have continually
held that property can enter the estate through provisions other than
§ 541.2" To provide guidance to these courts, § 541(a) should be
amended to clearly reflect that § 541(a) is the "only" section of the
Code by which property becomes part of the estate.
Additionally, § 541 must be amended to address the status of
property acquired by the debtor through fraud. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Code, courts held that property acquired by the debtor
through fraud did not become part of the estate2m The trustee's title
as derived from the debtor was subject to the claims of the rightful
owner.2 The trustee's rights and powers of the strong-arm clause
were limited to those of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor and were
held not to allow the trustee to bring into the estate property ac-
quired by the debtor through fraud.'
The Bankruptcy Code, by giving the trustee the status of a bona
fide purchaser, created a problem. A bona fide purchaser would be
able to acquire the property fraudulently acquired by the debtor free
of the claims of the rightful owner.' Thus, the trustee's new status as
a bona fide purchaser potentially conferred the same rights on the
trustee. To clearly indicate that Congress did not intend for the Code
to change the pre-Code law, § 541(b) should be amended to specifi-
cally except from the estate property acquired by the debtor through
fraud.
27& See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1994).
279. See id § 541(a).
280. See supra Part V.A.
281. See id.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 98-109.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See supra Part II.B.
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To achieve these results, the following amendments are sug-
gested:
§ 541. Property of the estate.
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301,302, or
303 of this title creates an estate. 'Such estate is eomprised
ef-al comprises only the following property, wherever lo-
cated and by whomever held:
(b) Property of the estate does not include-
(5) any interest of the debtor in real or personal property ac-
quired by the debtor through fraud.
B. The Strong-Arm Clause
When Congress amended the strong-arm clause to confer on the
trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser, the strong-arm clause ex-
tended far beyond its original purpose, which was to permit the trus-
tee to avoid secret liens and conveyances of the debtor's property.'
This is analagous to what occurred when the preference clause of the
Bankruptcy Act was amended so as to define when a transfer oc-
curred in terms of when a bona fide purchaser could no longer defeat
the interest transferred.tm Congress recognized the implications of
the amendments to the preference clause and corrected it.2' This
same correction is now required upon the text of the strong-arm
clause.
The trustee's strong-arm powers under the Bankruptcy Act were
limited to those rights of a judicial lien creditor.2'09 The Code ex-
panded these powers to encompass the rights and powers of a bona
fide purchaser.29' Since a bona fide purchaser from the debtor would
take the property interest acquired by the debtor through fraud free
of the claims of the rightful owner, the trustee arguably has the same
right. However, the legislative history of the Code indicates that the
286. The recommended amendments set out the text of the current statute.
Text in the current statute which is to be removed is stricken out and text to be
added is italicized.
287. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part III.C.
289. See supra Part III.D.
290. See supra Part III.
291. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
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trustee's bona fide purchaser status was added because creditors were
being denied remedies inside of bankruptcy that they had available
outside of bankruptcy.2' Giving the trustee the rights and powers of
a bona fide purchaser, goes further than necessary to protect the le-
gitimate interests of creditors.
The text of § 544 should be limited to reflect that the trustee's
rights and powers as a bona fide purchaser are limited to those that a
creditor could exercise outside of bankruptcy. To achieve this end,
the trustee's abilities as a bona fide purchaser should be limited to
avoiding transfers that a bona fide purchaser can avoid. By limiting
the trustee's powers as a bona fide purchaser of real property to
avoiding transfers, the trustee will be able to recovery property inter-
ests conveyed by unperfected transfers. If, however, the debtor has
acquired an interest in real property by fraud, the trustee would not
be able to bring the remaining interests in that property into the es-
tate since the possessors of those interests did- not acquire them by a
transfer from the debtor.
To accomplish these goals, § 544 should be amended to read:
§ 544. Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to certain
creditors and purchasers.
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the
case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or
of any other creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid
any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation in-
curred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of
the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such
time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a
creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of
the commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time
and with respect to such credit, an execution against the
debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or
not such a creditor exists;
(3) a bona fide purthasr of real property, other than fix-
mrces, frem the debtor, against whem applicable law porit
292. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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sueh transfer to be porffoted, that obtains the statuis of-a
bona fido purchaser and has prfeet.d sueh transfer atth
time of the eemmoneemnt of the case, whther or not such
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is void-
able by a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than
fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law per-
mits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a
bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the
time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a
purchaser exists.
(b)(c) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section
502(e) of this title.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a comprehensive revi-
sion of the United States' bankruptcy laws. It was not, however, cre-
ated in a vacuum. Its roots go back for centuries. Certainly, things
have changed since the early Roman days when "the creditors might
cut the debtor's body into pieces, and each of them take his propor-
tionable share"'2 and the bankruptcy laws must evolve as times
change.
The courts must recognize changes in the law. But the past can-
not simply be discarded because the words may have changed. The
courts which have further victimized fraud victims have done so by
attempting to interpret the text of the Bankruptcy Code without
taking into consideration the history behind the Code.
The strong-arm powers were enacted "to preserve but not to
enlarge the rights of creditors." 294 The extension of the strong-arm
powers in 1978 to confer on the trustee the status as a bona fide
purchaser of real property should be read in light of this principle.
The history of the strong-arm clause and the property of the es-
293. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 472.
294. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
BANKRUPTCY § 751, at 916 (4th ed. 1926).
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tate clause clearly show that property the debtor acquires by fraud
cannot be used to settle the claims against the debtor. The strong-
arm powers should not be extended to give creditors remedies inside
of bankruptcy that are not available outside of bankruptcy, at the ex-
pense of innocent third-parties who would be protected outside of
bankruptcy.
R. Paul Barkes, Jr.*
* This Comment would not have been possible without the love and pa-
tience of my wife and son, Catherine and Andrew Barkes. For this I thank them.
I would like to thank Professor Dan Schechter for his inspiration and assistance
in bringing this Comment to print. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to my par-
ents and family for their support over the past three years.
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